

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION

FRANCILE MARTIN

PLAINTIFF

V.

CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 4:05cv60-LN

CITY OF MACON, MISSISSIPPI,
ROBERT BROWN, in his individual
and official capacities, and EDDIE FRANKLIN

DEFENDANTS

FINAL JUDGMENT

This cause came on for hearing on a regular day of Court, with Plaintiff and the Defendants appearing with their attorneys of record. Both sides announcing they were ready for trial, and issue being joined herein:

WHEREUPON, came a jury composed of seven good and lawful jurors of the State of Mississippi, who were empaneled, selected and accepted by Plaintiff and Defendants to try said cause, and who were duly sworn and after hearing all of the evidence, argument of Plaintiff and Defendants' counsel, and receiving instructions of the Court, retired to consider their verdict, and presently returned into open Court the following verdict to-wit:

"We, the jury, find for the defendant, City of Macon, on plaintiff Francile Martin's claim for sex discrimination."

"We, the jury, find for the defendant, City of Macon, on plaintiff Francile Martin's claim for retaliation."

"We, the jury, find for the defendant, Robert Brown, on plaintiff Francile Martin's claim for malicious interference with employment."

Said panel was polled and the decision was unanimous. Accordingly, and pursuant to the Court's ruling at trial granting in part the defendant City of Macon's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law regarding all retaliation claims (leaving only the plaintiff's claim for retaliation for the filing of this lawsuit, which was presented to the jury for decision), and pursuant to the Plaintiff's stipulation at the close of all proof that her remaining claims for retaliation be

presented to the jury under Title VII alone, and pursuant to the Plaintiff's stipulation at the close of her case in chief at trial and in response to the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, that all claims against defendant Eddie Franklin should be dismissed, and pursuant to the Plaintiff's stipulation at the close of her case in chief at trial and in response to the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, that the defamation claim against defendant Robert Brown should be dismissed, and pursuant to the Plaintiff's stipulation at the close of her case in chief at trial and in response to the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, that her claim for denial of "liberty" in violation of the due process clause of the United States Constitution should be dismissed, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff's claims against all defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 19th day of October, 2006.

/s/ Tom S. Lee

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE